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Abstract 
A number of papers have recently argued that men and women have different attitudes and 
behavioural responses to competition. Laboratory experiments suggest that these gender 
differences are very large but it is important to be able to map these findings into real world 
differences. In this paper, we use performance pay as an indicator of competition in the 
workplace and compare the gender gap in incidence of performance pay and earnings and 
work effort under these contracts. Women are less likely to found in performance pay 
contracts but the gender gap is small. Furthermore, the effect of performance pay on earnings 
is modest and does not differ markedly by gender. Consequently the ability of these theories 
to explain the gender pay gap seems very limited. 
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Introduction 
Economists have long struggled to offer a complete explanation of the gender pay gap – 
although factors like differences in labour market experience do have considerable 
explanatory power, a sizeable gap typically remains after the best attempts to explain it 
(see Altonji and Blank, 1999, or Blau and Kahn, 2006).  Recently, a new class of 
explanations have been proposed – that, by the time they enter the labour market, women 
and men differ in psychological attitudes that affect the type of  employment contracts 
they favour and their performance therein1.  For example, Gneezy et al (2003) find that 
women perform less well than men in tournaments, particularly mixed-sex tournaments.  
Also, Dohmen and Falk (2006) and Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find that women seek 
to avoid variable pay schemes (that tend to raise productivity) and tournaments.  All of 
these studies use evidence from laboratory experiments, but their conclusions chime with 
other research, e.g. Babcock and Laschever (2003) who argue that women’s attitudes not 
their productivity per se accounts, at least partially, for their lower earnings.  The gender 
gaps found in these experiments are often very large.  For example, Dohmen and Falk 
(2006) show that, even after controlling for productivity, women are about 15% less 
likely to enter a variable pay scheme than men.   And in Gneezy et al (2003) the gender 
gap in performance in mixed-sex tournaments is 33%. 
 This paper is an attempt to do evaluate the importance of these ideas in practice 
for our understanding of the gender pay gap.  We use data from the 1998 and 2004 
British Workplace Employees Relations Survey (WERS) that contains information on the 
                                                 
1
 There is a debate which we will not discuss in detail here about whether these effects are nature or nurture 
– the evidence in Gneezy, Leonard and List (2008) and Booth and Nolen (2008) suggest some role for 
nurture as the first paper finds women are more competitive than men in a matriarchal society and the 
second finds no gender differences for those who went to single-sex schools. 
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nature of the pay schemes individuals work under.  We use the presence of a performance 
pay contract as an indicator of a more competitive environment in the workplace.   
One should acknowledge at the outset that we do not have an experimental 
design, nor do we know exactly the nature of the incentives workers face in the 
performance pay contracts we study, so that one potential criticism of our conclusion is 
that we are not capturing in our variables the measures the laboratory studies have found 
to be important.  To allay such fears we provide various upper bounds on the part of the 
gender pay gap that can be explained by the competition hypothesis. 
  The plan of the paper is as follows:  In the next section, we describe the data.  The 
second section then considers selection of men and women into performance pay 
contracts.  In the third section, the effects on earnings are presented.  The fourth section 
discusses some potential limitations of our results, and the fifth section concludes. 
 
1. Data 
The Workplace Employees Relations Survey (WERS) is an establishment-based survey 
that collects detailed information on many aspects of employment relations in Great 
Britain.  In one form or other it has been conducted 5 times since 1980 though we only 
use the two most recent surveys – in 1998 and 2004 – as only these contain information 
on the earnings of individuals.   In each of these surveys, managers are interviewed and 
provide a very wide range of information on human resource practices within the 
establishment, including the pay system – the present focus of interest.  There is then a 
sample of workers who answer questions about themselves (collecting information on 
most of the usual demographics) including their earnings.   
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WERS contains information on the use of a number of different types of variable 
pay schemes – profit-sharing, employee share-ownership and performance pay.  In this 
paper, we focus exclusively on the impact of performance pay schemes as these seem to 
have the largest effects on behaviour and are the focus of interest in the experimental 
literature discussed in the introduction.  In WERS, information on the use of performance 
pay is collected for 9 broad occupational groups (essentially the 1-digit level) from the 
management respondent, so we do have some within-plant variation in the use of 
performance pay as some plants use performance pay for some occupations and not for 
others. 
The category of  ‘performance pay’ encompasses a wide range of incentive 
schemes from piece-rates in which individual pay is related to an objective measure of 
individual output to merit pay based on subjective assessments of managers.  WERS does 
contain information on the type of performance pay contract in use (whether it is 
payment-by-results or merit pay), the level at which performance is assessed (whether it 
is the individual, group or workplace) and the method of assessment of performance (e.g. 
piece-rates or subjective assessment).  However, this information is not disaggregated by 
occupation – we only have information on whether these types of performance pay 
contracts are used for any workers within the plant – this means that the types of 
performance pay contracts are not mutually exclusive and managers can report the use of 
multiple types.  Because one cannot link the type of performance pay contract to workers 
in particular occupations, our main analysis uses the presence of performance pay as an 
indicator of a more competitive environment within the plant.  But we do experiment at 
various points with dividing performance pay contracts into different types.   
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It is important to consider the relationship between the ‘performance pay’ variable 
that is the focus of interest in this paper and the ‘competitive’ versus ‘non-competitive’ 
pay schemes that have been the focus of the experimental literature.  That literature has 
typically compared ‘piece-rates’ and ‘tournaments’, with the former interpreted as a non-
competitive pay scheme and the latter as a competitive one (though Dohmen and Falk, 
2006, also consider a fixed-pay scheme).  In our classification, we interpret all 
performance pay schemes (including piece-rates) as a more competitive environment than 
fixed-pay schemes, though we do make some attempt to classify performance pay 
schemes into different types (described below).  There are a number of reasons why we 
think that piece-rates are more competitive pay schemes than assumed in the 
experimental literature.  First, in real-world work environments, people generally do not 
work in isolation and the differences in pay that result from piece-rates will typically be 
quite visible and there will be seen to be ‘winners’ and ‘losers’.  Secondly, in the real 
world, earnings under piece-rates are not independent.  If some workers produce a lot 
under piece-rates, the piece-rate will typically be adjusted downwards as employers seek 
to set total earnings to match what could be obtained on the outside labour market.  In the 
folklore of the working class ‘rate-busters’ were disliked because their greater output 
resulted in lower earnings for others as the piece-rate was adjusted downwards. 
Nonetheless, it could be argued that some forms of performance pay contracts are 
more competitive than piece-rates and can come closer to the tournaments considered in 
the experimental literature.  For example, the most common form of merit pay is a system 
where the employer decides on a pot of money to be used for merit pay and then the 
allocation across individuals is decided – in this case, there is an effective tournament as 
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a pound extra for one worker is a pound less for everyone else.  Of course these 
tournaments are nowhere near as extreme as the ‘winner-take-all’ approach in many of 
the experimental studies but it is important to study incentive schemes that are actually 
used.  In what follows we do investigate whether the impact of piece-rates and merit pay 
is different.    
 
2. Do Women Shy Away From Competition? 
In this section, we discuss the incidence of performance pay schemes and consider 
whether women are under-represented in jobs which have those schemes.  Table 1 
presents the incidence of performance pay schemes in the WERS data.  Panel A uses data 
from the employee profile questionnaire completed by management together with the 
weights required to reproduce the British working population, i.e. this should be an 
estimate of the proportion of workers in Britain as a whole on performance pay contracts.  
In the 1998 sample 16.3% of workers were in jobs which used performance pay, and this 
rose to 32% in 2004.  Although there is little surprise that the use of performance pay is 
rising over this period, the magnitude of the rise does seem large.  However, a direct 
question in the 2004 survey reveals that 12% of establishments report that they have 
introduced performance related pay in the last 2 years, so the increases reported in Table 
1 may not be implausible.  This table also reports the prevalence of performance pay for 
men and women, a first indication of whether women are under-represented in 
performance pay contracts.  In 1998 men are 4 percentage points more likely than women 
to have performance pay, and this gap rose to 8 percentage points in 2004.  Panel B of 
Table 1 shows the incidence of performance pay among the individuals in the workers 
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sample of WERS – the sample we will use for analysis.  The proportions in Panel B are 
very similar to those derived using the basic workforce information reported in Panel A.    
These raw gender differences in the incidence of performance pay are much smaller than 
those typically reported in the experimental literature. 
 Is there any evidence that women shy away from particular types of performance 
pay contracts?  Table 2 shows the proportion of men and women with performance pay 
who are in plants with either or both of merit pay and payment-by-results.  There is no 
indication here of women avoiding the merit pay schemes that might be thought to be 
more competitive – if anything, women are more likely to be on such schemes, though 
the gender gap is small.  There may also be a difference in the level at which performance 
in assessed, e.g. very competitive individuals might prefer individual-based schemes 
while others might prefer team or workplace-based schemes.  Table 3 shows that the 
most common form of performance pay contracts are individual-based but that there is 
little raw difference between men and women in the level of the measures used to 
evaluate performance. 
 Tables 1-3 do not control for any other relevant factors, and we next consider 
their importance.  When we control for additional characteristics, the gender differential 
remains small and often insignificant.  Table 4 estimates probit models of whether an 
individual is in a performance pay contract, with gender on the right-hand side and 
different sets of covariates.  The first row includes only a dummy for gender, the next 
row personal demographics, the third row establishment characteristics, the fourth row 
occupation dummies.  The fifth column estimates a linear-probability model with 
establishment fixed effects.  In all of these estimates, the extent to which women seem to 
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shy away from performance-related pay is much smaller than the gaps reported in the 
experimental literature and the inclusion of some regressors can fully explain the gap.   In 
particular, the inclusion of job dummies turns a gap of 4-5 percentage points into 
something close to 0.5 percentage point.  We do not find strong support for the finding of 
Gneezy and Rustichini (2006) that the differences within occupations are smaller than the 
raw differential – the inclusion of occupation in the fourth row actually raises the gender 
gap slightly.   
It is not immediately obvious which specification is the best to use as an estimate 
of the gender difference in performance pay contracts.  If it is the case that women seek 
to avoid competitive situations, this may show up in the choice of occupation, industry, 
public or private sector or unionization.  In this case the best evidence would be the 
specification that controls only for personal characteristics.  However, there may be other 
reasons why women end up in different sectors from men, and factors apart from gender 
differences in the attitude to competition that explain the variation in the use of 
performance pay across sectors.  It would then be wrong to assign all of the raw gender 
gap in the incidence of performance pay contracts to different attitudes to competition 
among men and women.  As this paper argues that the overall explanatory power of the 
‘competition’ hypothesis is small, we err on the side of generosity and use estimates that 
include only personal and not job characteristics as our main specification.  However, we 
do report estimates in some tables with different sets of controls to give some idea of the 
sensitivity of results to specification – these other specifications generally suggest 
performance pay is even less important in explaining the gender pay gap. 
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 As discussed previously, one might argue that the measure of a performance pay 
contract used here is not a perfect measure of ‘competition’ that is used in the 
experimental literature.  There are a number of ways in which we might investigate that 
hypothesis.  We argued above that merit pay schemes are more likely to be ‘tournaments’ 
than piece-rate schemes.  The sixth and seventh rows of Table 4 restrict the sample to 
those on performance pay contracts and estimate probit models for having merit pay and 
payments-by-results.  Gender gaps are small and insignificantly different from zero but, if 
anything, women are more likely to be in merit pay systems.  It might also be the case 
that women’s greater aversion to competition leads them to end up in fewer jobs with 
individual-based performance pay (as opposed to group-based performance pay).  The 
eighth row of Table 4 shows that this does not seem to be the case – women and men on 
performance pay schemes are equally likely to be in schemes using individual measures 
of performance.  
 The estimates in Table 4 can be thought of as an average across all jobs – but 
perhaps it is only women in some sorts of jobs who shy away from competition.  To 
investigate this, Table 5 estimates separate probit models for the 9 1-digit occupations 
reporting estimates both with and without controls for job characteristics.  None of the 
gender gaps are particularly large, but not all of them are negative and there does not 
seem to be any very noticeable pattern to the coefficients. 
 In conclusion, although women are less likely than men to be found in 
performance pay contracts, the difference is much smaller than the size of effect reported 
in the experimental literature.  However, we need to be able to say something about the 
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effect of performance pay on earnings before we can say anything about the size of the 
contribution to the gender pay gap – this is the topic of the next section. 
 
3. The Effects of Performance Pay on Earnings 
We now turn to the effects on pay.  We start by estimating simple earnings functions 
pooling both men and women with a gender dummy.  The earnings data in WERS refers 
to weekly earnings and is banded.  We use a number of estimation models for this data – 
an interval regression model, with and without allowance for heteroskedasticity, and a 
model in which we simply use the mid-points of the bands.  The first row of Table 6 
includes nothing but a gender dummy showing a log hourly pay differential of 23 log 
points in line with other estimates (Anderson et al, 2001).  The next rows show how this 
changes when one includes personal characteristics, job characteristics (including the 
gender mix on the job) and occupation.  Inclusion of personal characteristics (the second 
row) reduces the gender pay gap to 21 log points and job characteristics (the third row) to 
17 log points and including, in addition, occupation (the fourth row), reduces it further to 
14 log points.  The fifth row then shows that the estimate from the interval regression 
model is essentially identical if one allows for heteroskedasticity related to all the 
covariates and the sixth row shows that one obtains essentially the same estimate if one 
estimates a linear regression model using mid-points of the pay bands to assign weekly 
earnings (plus 1.4 times the top band).  Because recognising the banded nature of the data 
makes very little difference to the estimates, the rest of the paper just uses linear 
regressions.  The seventh row includes establishment fixed effects – the reduction in the 
estimated gender pay gap to 10 log points shows that women are concentrated in low-
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paying firms.  The eighth row includes fixed effects for the plant-occupation combination 
– this reduces the gender pay gap still further, though the reduction is only a modest one.  
Finally, the last two rows report the results of Oaxaca decompositions where the 
coefficients in male and female earnings equations are estimated separately and the 
reported results are the pay gaps evaluated at the average man and average woman.  All 
of these results are in line with what others have found when studying the UK gender pay 
gap using other data sets (see, for example, Anderson et al, 2001). 
  Table 7 also reports estimates of earnings functions but now including the 
presence of performance pay as an additional regressor.  The estimate in the first row 
includes no regressors other than gender and performance pay.  The gender coefficient is 
very similar to that reported in the similar specification in Table 6 because, as shown in 
the previous section, women are not strongly selected out of performance pay schemes.  
The presence of a performance pay scheme is estimated to raise wages by 17.5 log points.  
However, as the other rows of Table 7 show, this effect is much reduced if one includes 
other covariates, reflecting the fact that high-level occupations are more likely to have 
performance pay.  Including personal controls reduces the effect to 12.8 log points, 
adding job controls reduces the effect to 8.6 log points and inclusion of occupation to 4.6 
log points.  If plant fixed effects are included, the estimate is only 2.5 log points, though 
it remains significantly different from zero2.  These modest estimates of the effects of 
performance pay schemes on average earnings are in line with what other studies have 
found (e.g. Lemieux, MacLeod and Parent (2006) though they stand in contrast to the 
very large effects found in the experimental studies and some studies of specific 
                                                 
2
 We cannot go further and include plant-occupation fixed effects as in Table 8 as performance pay 
schemes are defined at this level. 
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performance-related pay schemes (Lazear, 2000, Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2005).  
A possible reason for this is that most performance pay schemes are not very high-
powered while those individual schemes that have been studied are.   
The estimates of the gender pay gap in Table 7 are very similar to those found 
when the performance pay variable was excluded, suggesting that performance pay 
schemes contribute little to our understanding of the gender pay gap.  But the estimates so 
far have been based on the assumption that male and female earnings functions differ 
only in the intercept.  Table 8 investigates whether relaxing this assumption makes any 
difference by estimating separate male and female wage equations.  The first two 
columns report the coefficient on performance pay in male and female earnings 
functions.  Contrary to what might be expected from the experimental literature, the 
returns to a performance pay scheme seem very similar for women and men. 
The third and fourth columns of Table 8 investigate whether there is a different 
effect from having a merit-based or piece-rate pay system.  These variables are only 
available for 2004, so the sample size is smaller here, but there is no evidence of any 
difference in the effects of these pay schemes.  The fifth and sixth columns then 
investigate one of the findings of Gneezy et al (2003), namely that performance in 
competition is affected by the gender mix.  We have information on the gender mix of the 
job done by the worker which we divide into mostly male, mixed and mostly female.  
The fifth column estimates a male earnings function in which the omitted category is the 
most common – male-dominated.  There is a marginally significantly negative effect of 
being in a female-dominated job with a performance pay scheme – this is different from 
the finding of Gneezy et al (2003) who find men perform better when competing against 
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women.  The seventh column estimates a female earnings function in which the omitted 
category is a female-dominated job.  There is no evidence the gender mix of the job has 
any effect on the pay impact of a performance pay contract. 
All of the estimates presented so far suggest a very modest contribution of 
competition based pay schemes to the overall gender pay gap.  For example, if we 
assume a return to a performance pay contract of 12.4% (the first two columns of Table 
8) and ask how the gender pay gap would be affected if there were no performance pay 
schemes, the gender pay gap would be reduced by 0.124*(0.238-0.192)=0.0057 as 23.8% 
of men and 19.2% of women are on performance pay.  The estimated contribution is 
approximately half of one percentage point.  The reason for this is simple – the returns to 
performance pay are modest as is the gender difference in the incidence of performance 
pay3. 
We make one final attempt to find a large effect of performance pay on earnings.  
The estimates presented so far assume performance pay affects only the intercept of the 
earnings function but it might effect other coefficients as well (for example, Lemieux, 
Parent and MacLeod, 2006, find higher returns to education and lower returns to job 
tenure with performance pay).  To investigate this without being too restrictive about the 
way in which performance pay affects earnings, we use a re-weighting estimate of the 
impact of performance pay along the lines first used by diNardo, Fortin and Lemieux 
(1996).  Under the assumption (which we have made throughout this paper) that the 
presence of a performance pay scheme is exogenous conditional on the included 
                                                 
3
 There is perhaps an echo here of the results of Manning and Swaffield (2008) who investigate the impact 
of psychological variables on earnings – although they do find these variables affect earnings and that men 
and women are different, they fail to explain a sizeable effect of the gender pay gap as the differences are 
not large enough. 
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covariates, we can estimate a probit model for the presence of performance pay for men 
and women separately, and then re-weight those observations without performance pay to 
get an estimate of what the distribution of earnings would have been in the absence of 
performance pay.   One can then take the difference between men and women to get an 
estimate of what the gender pay gap would have been in the absence of performance pay, 
and compare this to the gender pay gap with performance pay to get an estimate of the 
contribution of competition to the gender pay gap.  The result of this exercise is a gap of 
less than one percentage point, reinforcing our conclusion that performance pay explains 
little of the gender pay gap. 
 
4. Potential Criticisms 
We have failed to find any sizeable important role played by performance pay in 
explaining the gender pay gap, and we have interpreted this as saying that there is little 
evidence that the differing attitudes and responses to competition of men and women is 
important in the labour market.  But, it is worth reflecting on the possible way in which 
our conclusions might be misleading and why we get results so different from the 
experimental evidence.  In this section we discuss possible explanations. 
 First, our approach assumes that, conditional on the covariates, having 
performance pay is exogenous – we do not have a research design with random 
assignment of performance pay.  Existing studies, both experimental (Dohmen and Falk, 
2006) and from the field (Lazear, 2000) tend to find it is the more able workers who 
select into performance pay contracts - in this case, our estimated effects of performance 
pay, small though they are, are most likely to be over-estimates. 
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 Perhaps more problematic is the argument that the rewards from competition are 
not in current wages but in something like promotion so that our outcome measure is not 
the most appropriate one.  However, existing British evidence (notably Booth, 
Francesconi and Frank, 2003) find that women actually have higher promotion rates than 
men and that women’s lower average position in the occupational hierarchy is the result 
of career interruptions generally associated with having children that are probably not 
associated with the outcome of competition.  But, to investigate this a bit further we use 
the idea that, whatever the rewards are, the purpose of incentive schemes is to encourage 
effort.  To this end, we use how much workers agree or disagree with the statement ‘my 
job requires that I work very hard’ – which is coded from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree).  In Table 9 we use this as the dependent variable and estimate equations 
similar to the earlier earnings equations.  The first column shows that women report 
working significantly harder than men – the second column shows that this is robust to 
the inclusion of other controls.  When the presence of performance pay is added, the 
coefficient on female is unaltered but we do find, as expected, that people work harder 
under incentive schemes.  The fourth column estimates an equation only for men and the 
fifth for women.  The estimates do suggest that the gap between effort with and without 
performance pay is significantly larger for men than for women though the estimates are 
small in absolute terms.  One would have to believe that hard work has a very large 
material pay-off for this differential to be able to explain much of the gender pay gap.4  
The next two columns then investigate whether the gender mix of the job affects the 
effort put in.  Men’s effort response to performance pay is largest in female-dominated 
                                                 
4
 Incidentally, if one includes hard work in an earnings function, it has a coefficient of 0.0038 with a t-
statistic of 2.  However, it is likely that this coefficient is biased so not too much weight should be put on 
that. 
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jobs while women seem to respond less in male-dominated jobs.  This is one area where 
we find an effect in line with the experimental evidence.  However, it is unlikely this can 
explain much of the gender gap in performance as very few men work in female-
dominated jobs and very few women in male-dominated jobs.  One gets some indication 
of this in the fourth and fifth columns where the coefficient on performance pay can be 
thought of as approximately a weighted average of the effects of being in jobs of different 
gender mixes – here the gender differences, though significant, are small. 
 A further potential criticism is that the intensity of competition within a job is not 
well-measured by the presence of a performance pay contract although the evidence 
presented does suggest that performance pay raises earnings and increases work effort in 
line with what theory would predict.  However, it is likely a degree of misclassification is 
induced by our equation of performance pay contracts with ‘competitive’ pay schemes.  
We will argue that it is hard for any model of misclassification to be able to reconcile our 
estimates with a sizeable gender difference in the incidence of competitive contracts, a 
higher return to ‘competition’ among men (both findings that are emphasized by the 
experimental literature) and a sizeable true effect of competition on the gender pay gap. 
We start first with our measurement of the contribution of ‘competition’ to the 
overall gender pay gap – the measure we use is how much the gap  would change if there 
were no competitive pay schemes – this is given by: 
ffmm CC **** ββ −     (1) 
Where 
mC *  ( fC * ) is the true fraction of men (women) in competitive pay schemes and  
*mβ  ( * fβ ) the true returns for men (women) from being in a competitive pay scheme. 
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Now let us assume that *C  is measured with error.  Assume that the probability of 
being wrongly classified is 1r  if * 1C =  and 0r  if * 0C = .  Denote the observed variable 
(performance pay in our application) by C .  With the assumptions about 
misclassification we will have that: 
 ( ) ( )1 01 * 1 *C r C r C= − + −     (2) 
This can be re-arranged to give:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 01 1 1 *C r r r C− = + − − −    (3) 
This misclassification will tend to produce attenuation bias in the returns to performance 
pay.  Using the formula in Freeman (1984, equation 8) this is given by: 
( ) ( )( )1 0
* 1 *
ˆlim * 1 , ,
1
i i
i i
i i
C C
p r r i m f
C C
β β −= − − =
−
   (4) 
Re-arranging this we have that:  
 
( )
( )( )1 0
1
ˆ* * , ,
1 1 *
i i
i i i
i
C C
C i m f
r r C
β β −= =
− − −
   (5) 
Where the left-hand side is the contribution of performance pay to the earnings of men 
and women as defined in (1).  Now, using (3), (5) can be written as:  
 
( )
( ) 1
1
ˆ* * , ,
1
i
i i i i
i
C
C C i m f
C r
β β −= =
− −
   (6) 
Note that the term ˆi iCβ  (both elements of which are observable) is the contribution we 
would use assuming there is no measurement error.  The final term on the right-hand side 
of (6) must be bigger than one showing that measurement error will attenuate the effects.  
It is interesting to note that the attenuation bias depends only on 1r , the misclassification 
rate for those who are in competitive pay schemes - 0r , the misclassification rate for 
those who are not in competitive pay schemes plays no role in (6).  One implication of 
this is that if our classification of competitive pay schemes is incorrect in the sense that 
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all the fixed pay schemes we classify as non-competitive are truly non-competitive but 
some of the performance pay schemes we classify as competitive are, in reality, non-
competitive, our estimates of the contribution of performance pay to the gender pay gap 
will be correct even though there will be attenuation bias in our estimates of the return to 
‘competition’ – the reason is that, although we are under-estimating the returns to 
competition we are over-estimating the proportion of workers on competitive pay 
schemes and these two effects work in opposite directions and exactly cancel each other 
out. 
 But, if some of the fixed pay schemes are really competitive we will have 1 0r >  
and we will be under-estimating the importance of competition.  But, one has to have 
very large misclassification rates for the bias to be large.  For example, suppose we 
assumed that we observe 25% of men and 20% of women in performance pay contracts 
(an average across the years observed in Table 1).  Furthermore assume that the estimated 
response of hourly wages to being in a performance pay contract is 0.124 (a generous 
estimate taken from the first two columns of Table 8).  Using these numbers we can 
compute the ‘true’ contribution of ‘competition’ to the gender pay gap for different 
values of 1r .  The results are shown in Panel A of Table 10.  The first row is our 
measured effect with no misclassification – as mentioned earlier this is very small.  But 
what is striking from Panel A is that the misclassification rate has to be very large to 
produce any much larger effects.  For example a misclassification rate of 60% is required 
for the true contribution of ‘competition’ to the gender pay gap to be 5 log points, about 
one-quarter of the total. 
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 Even if the misclassification rate is that high, the ‘competition’ story runs into 
other problems.  First, a misclassification rate of 60% on ‘competitive pay contracts’ 
puts, from a re-arrangement of (2), an upper bound on the misclassification rate for ‘non-
competitive’ pay contracts of 20% given we observe 20% of women in performance pay 
contracts. 
 Panel B of Table 10 then takes a misclassification rate of 60% for ‘competitive 
pay contracts’ and shows, for different values of r0, the implied true gender difference in 
the incidence of ‘competitive pay contracts’ (from (2)) and the implied true rates of return 
to being in a competitive contract for men and women (from (4)).  Note that if we choose 
a value of r0 that implies a gender gap in the true incidence that is close to 20% as the 
experimental literature suggests, then this implies that women have a higher return to 
performance pay than men, the opposite of the experimental findings.  Our bottom line is 
that it is very hard to find any pattern of misclassification errors to reconcile all of our 
findings with the experimental literature even before we start to debate whether such 
misclassification rates are plausible5.  Even these computations have been based on what 
are probably over-estimates of the importance of performance pay – other estimates in 
the paper would suggest even more modest effects.  We would therefore suggest that 
misclassification of ‘competitive’ pay schemes cannot explain our results. 
 Finally, it might be argued that, while differing gender attitudes to competition 
can explain little of the gender pay gap among the average worker, they can explain more 
among very senior managers and professionals – indeed, both Gneezy et al (2003) and 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) motivate their papers by the under-representation of 
                                                 
5
 It should be noted that we have assumed misclassification errors to be the same for men and women.  
Introducing gender differences in error rates introduces enough degrees of freedom to solve the problem we 
identify here but seems a slim thread on which to hang the theory. 
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women in very senior jobs.  However, although that may be the motivation offered, the 
actual participants in their experiments (students) and the tasks they undertake are not 
particularly demanding (though see Gneezy and Rustichini, 2006, for experimental 
evidence from teachers and executives).  Indeed, it is reasonable to think that their 
experimental evidence is of sizeable gender differences in the attitudes to competition 
among average workers doing an average job.  But, to check these ideas, we do run 
separate regressions for managers and professionals.  The first column of Table 11 shows 
that the gender pay gap among managers and professionals is lower than the average, not 
what one might expect if competition is more intense among this group and women fare 
badly in that.  The second column then includes a dummy variable for performance pay – 
this has a significant positive effect somewhat larger than that estimated for all workers 
though still fairly modest.  Finally, the third and fourth columns estimate separate 
equations for men and women – if anything, the return to performance pay is higher for 
women than men.  The bottom line is that, even among managers and professionals, there 
seems to be little evidence of competition being an important aspect of the gender pay 
gap. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Recent evidence from laboratory experiments suggests that men and women have 
different attitudes to and responses to competition in the workplace.  These studies 
suggest that a sizeable part of the gender pay gap could be explained in this way.  
However, these results are best thought of as indicating a direction for future research 
than providing reliable estimates of the gender pay attributable to these factors.  In this 
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paper, we have attempted to provide an estimate of the portion of the gender pay gap in 
the UK that can be attributed to these differing attitudes to competition.  We find very 
modest evidence for differential sorting into performance pay schemes by gender, and 
small effects of performance pay on hourly wages.  Furthermore, and unlike the 
laboratory studies, we find no significant effect of the gender mix in the job on the 
responsiveness to performance pay.  We do find some evidence for an effect of 
performance pay on a measure of work effort in line with the experimental evidence but 
the bottom line is that a very small part of the gender pay gap can be attributed to these 
factors.  Even an attempt to maximize the possible explanatory power of this hypothesis 
does not lead to very large contributions. 
Although we do not have an experimental design, we take some reassurance from 
the fact that studies with an experimental design from the real world (e.g. Bandiera, 
Barankay and Rasul, 2005; Paarsch and Shearer, 2007, Paserman, 2007, Lavy, 2008) also 
fail to find any large gender gaps6.  These are studies of very particular labour markets 
and it is not clear how representative they are but our results suggest their conclusions 
may well be valid for the labour market as a whole. 
Why do the experimental findings not show up in the real world literature?  We 
have no definitive answer and can only suggest possibilities.  First, the sample sizes in 
the experimental studies are often not large (sometimes less than 100) so the standard 
errors will typically be large and one needs to find dramatic effects for them to be 
significantly different from zero.  To obtain interesting results, the experiments may be 
designed to magnify differences, something the market would not generally do (see 
                                                 
6
 Though see Ors, Palomino and Peyrache (2008) who study gender differences in exams finding greater 
dispersion among men than women in competitive exams. 
 21
Lazear et al, 2004, for a similar point).  This may mean that the treatments considered are 
quite extreme, e.g. the tournaments typically have a ‘winner-take-all’ structure in which 
those who do not win get nothing (and, in the real world, presumably starve to death) and 
the piece-rates have a one-for-one incentive that is not seen even in the most high-
powered managerial incentive schemes (see, for example, Murphy, 1999).  Also, 
experimental design may have important effects on the results - indeed, the experiments 
themselves have sometimes differing conclusions about gender differences e.g. there is a 
significant difference in gender performance in tournaments in Gneezy et al, (2003), but 
not in Niederle and Vesterlund, (2007).  Also the results of Antonovics, Arcidiacano and 
Walsh (2005, 2008) suggest that the size of stakes may be important.  Or it may be that 
performance pay does have the effects found in the laboratory but that other factors are at 
work in the real world which act to mitigate or off-set the effect.   For example, it may be 
that it is harder to discriminate against women in performance pay contracts where pay 
and productivity end up more closely aligned (see Heywood and O’Halloran, 2005, and 
Fang and Heywood, 2006, for similar ideas applied to racial wage differentials).   
All of this means it is problematic to map the findings of the laboratory studies 
into a fraction of the real-world gender pay gap attributable to these explanations – one 
should perhaps regard them as having indicated an interesting direction for further 
research rather than a definitive statement of the effect in the labour market.  It may be an 
interesting avenue for future research to explore the gap between laboratory and real 
world evidence, but the bottom line here seems to be that little of the UK gender wage 
gap can be explained by gender differences in the incidence of and response to 
performance-related pay. 
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Table 1: The Incidence of Performance Pay Contracts 
 
 1998 2004 
Panel A: Basic Workforce Information  
All 16.3 32.1 
Men 18.6 36.2 
Women 14.2 28.3 
 
Panel B: Sample of Employees 
All 16.1 27.6 
Men 17.6 31.6 
Women 14.6 24.2 
 
Notes. 
1. Reported numbers are percentages. 
2. The numbers in Panel A use the reported levels of employment by management in 
each 1-digit occupation plus the establishment weights so should be an estimate of 
the incidence of performance pay contracts in the British economy as a whole. 
3. the numbers in Panel B are an unweighted average of the respondents to the 
employee survey in WERS. 
 
Table 2:  The Nature of Performance Pay Contracts 
 
 All Men Women 
Merit Pay 35.3 36.1 40.8 
Piece-Rates 35.9 37.1 34.5 
Both 25.8 26.8 24.6 
Sample Size 6069 3221 2848 
    
Notes. 
1. these numbers are the percentage of workers in performance pay contracts whose 
employer reports the use of merit pay, piece-rates or both.  Note that the presence 
of performance pay is defined at the occupation-plant level but the nature of that 
contract only at the plant level. 
2. this data is only available for 2004 so the sample sizes are smaller. 
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Table 3: The Measures Used to Evaluate Performance 
 
 All Men Women 
Individual 57.8 57.4 58.2 
Team or Group 34.2 35.7 32.4 
Workplace 25.4 26.8 23.8 
Organization 32.2 32.2 32.2 
Notes. 
1. these numbers are the percentage of workers in performance pay contracts whose 
employer reports the use of different measures of performance.  Multiple answers are 
possible so answers sum to more than 100%.  Note that the presence of performance pay is 
defined at the occupation-plant level but the nature of the measure used to evaluate 
performance only at the plant level. 
 
Table 4: Do Women Select Out of Performance Pay Contracts? 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Female 
Coefficient 
[s.e.] 
Personal 
Characteristics 
Job 
Characteristics 
Occupation Firm 
Fixed 
Effects 
Sample 
Performance 
Pay 
-0.049 
[0.007] 
No No no No All 
Performance 
Pay 
-0.053 
[0.007] 
Yes No no No All 
Performance 
Pay 
-0.004 
[0.007] 
Yes Yes no No All 
Performance 
Pay 
-0.012 
[0.006] 
Yes Yes Yes No All 
Performance 
Pay 
-0.005 
[0.002] 
Yes Yes Yes Yes All 
Merit Pay 0.014 
[0.020] 
Yes Yes Yes No Performance 
Pay 
Piece-Rates -0.005 
[0.019] 
Yes Yes Yes No Performance 
Pay 
Individual-
based 
performance 
pay 
0.009 
[0.017] 
Yes Yes Yes No Performance 
Pay 
Notes. 
1. All rows except the fifth report the marginal effects from a probit model – the fifth 
row is a linear probability model. 
2. sample sizes are 47367 for the first 5 rows and 5780 for the last two. 
3. all standard errors are robust, and clustered at the establishment-occupation level. 
4. personal characteristics are education, race, age, job tenure, marital status, and the 
presence of dependent children 
5. job characteristics are industry, log establishment size, public sector dummy, and 
union recognition. 
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Table 5 
Do Women Select Out of Performance Pay Contracts? 
Disaggregation by Occupation 
 
Dependent Variable: Worker on a Performance Pay Contract 
 
Sample Coefficient 
On Female 
Variable 
Standard 
Error 
On Female 
Variable 
Coefficient 
On Female 
Variable 
Standard 
Error 
On Female 
Variable 
Sample Size 
Managers -0.0247 [0.0177] 0.011 [0.018] 5244 
Professionals -0.11 [0.0151] -0.0165 [0.013] 7109 
Associate 
Professionals -0.0929 [0.0155] -0.0183 [0.013] 6228 
Clerical -0.0706 [0.0154] -0.0217 [0.013] 9445 
Craft -0.0654 [0.0326] -0.0163 [0.036] 3456 
Personal 
Service 0.00145 [0.00837] 0.0112 [0.0048] 3697 
Sales -0.0344 [0.0264] -0.0247 [0.026] 3416 
Operatives 0.0536 [0.0329] 0.0595 [0.031] 3782 
Other 
Occupations -0.0877 [0.0163] -0.0292 [0.012] 4923 
Controls 
Personal Characteristics 
Personal + Job 
Characteristics  
Notes. 
1. All rows report the marginal effects from a probit model 
2. all standard errors are robust, and clustered at the establishment-occupation level. 
3. The personal and job characteristics are those listed in the notes to Table 4. 
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Table 6: The Gender Pay Gap in WERS 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Wages 
 
Estimation 
Method 
Female 
Coefficient 
[s.e.] 
Personal 
Characteristics 
Job 
Characteristics 
Occupation Fixed 
Effects 
Other Comments 
Interval 
Regression 
-0.230 
[0.007] 
No No No No  
Interval 
Regression 
-0.207 
[0.006] 
Yes No No No  
Interval 
Regression 
-0.174 
[0.006] 
Yes Yes No No  
Interval 
Regression 
-0.142 
[0.005] 
Yes Yes Yes No  
Interval 
Regression 
-0.147 
[0.006] 
Yes Yes Yes No Allows for 
heteroskedasticity 
Midpoint 
Regression 
-0.142 
[0.005] 
Yes Yes Yes No  
Midpoint 
Regression 
-0.105 
[0.005] 
Yes Yes Yes Firm  
Midpoint 
Regression 
-0.092 
[0.005] 
Yes Yes Yes Firm* 
Occupatio
n 
 
Oaxaca 
decom-
position 
-0.208 
[0.004] 
Yes No No No Evaluated at average 
Female 
characteristics 
Oaxaca 
decom-
position 
-0.217 
[0.004] 
Yes No No No Evaluated at average 
male characteristics 
 
Notes. 
1. The sample size is 45527 
2. all standard errors are robust, and clustered at the establishment-occupation level. 
3. The personal and job characteristics are those listed in the notes to Table 4. 
4. the fifth row allows heteroskedasticity to be related to all variables. 
5. the Oaxaca decompositions estimate separate earnings functions for men and 
women using the midpoint method and then compute earnings gaps for the 
average woman and man. 
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Table 7: The Effects of Performance Pay On Earnings 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Wages 
 
Female 
Coefficient 
[s.e.] 
Performance 
Pay 
Coefficient 
Personal  
Characteristics 
Job 
Characteristics 
Occupation Fixed 
Effects 
-0.228 
[0.007] 
0.171 
[0.012] 
No No No No 
-0.205 
[0.006] 
0.128 
[0.009] 
Yes No No No 
-0.175 
[0.006] 
0.086 
[0.009] 
Yes Yes No No 
-0.142 
[0.005] 
0.046 
[0.007] 
Yes Yes Yes No 
-0.105 
[0.006] 
0.025 
[0.009] 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes. 
1. The dependent variable is the midpoint of the log hourly wage.  Sample sizes are 
45527 
2. all standard errors are robust, and clustered at the establishment-occupation level. 
3. The personal and job characteristics are those listed in the notes to Table 4. 
4. the fourth row allow heteroskedasticity to be related to all variables. 
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Table 8: The Effects of Performance Pay on Earnings by Gender 
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Wages 
 Men Women men women Men Women 
Performance 
pay 
0.124 0.124 0.0922 0.1 0.109 0.11 
[0.0106] [0.0113] [0.0392] [0.0417] [0.0133] [0.0139] 
Performance 
pay* merit 
pay 
  0.0753 0.0672   
  [0.0323] [0.0345]   
Performance 
pay* piece-
rates 
  -0.0153 -0.0367   
  [0.0314] [0.0344]   
Performance 
pay * mixed 
job 
    0.0358 -0.0003 
    [0.0181] [0.0180] 
Performance 
pay * male 
job 
     0.0443 
     [0.0365] 
Performance 
pay * female 
job 
    -0.0345  
    [0.0342]  
Personal  
characteristics 
Y Y y y y Y 
Observations 21937 23548 9463 10854 21314 22776 
Notes: 
1. As for Table 7.  The personal controls are as listed in Table 4. 
 
Table 9: The Effects of Performance Pay on Work Effort 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sample All All All Men Women Men Women 
Female 0.134 0.145 0.147     
 [0.00858] [0.00857] [0.00858]     
Performance pay   0.0345 0.0735 0.00937   
   [0.0112] [0.0152] [0.0153]   
Performance pay * 
male job 
     
0.0417 -0.0944 
      [0.0193] [0.0498] 
Performance pay * 
mixed job 
     
0.0976 -0.0107 
      [0.0212] [0.0202] 
Performance pay * 
female job 
     
0.158 0.00572 
      [0.0497] [0.0205] 
Personal  
characteristics 
No yes yes yes yes Yes Yes 
Observations 46771 46771 46771 22526 24245 21904 23459 
Notes: 
1. The dependent variable is the response to the question ‘my job requires that I 
work very hard’ with a 1 representing strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree. 
2. The personal characteristics are those listed in the notes to Table 4. 
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Table 10 
The Effects of Misclassification of Pay Contracts 
 
Panel A: The Effect of Misclassifying ‘Competitive Contracts’ on the Contribution of 
‘Competition’ to the gender pay gap 
 
Misclassification rate for 
‘competitive pay schemes, 
r1 
Contribution of 
‘competition’ to the gender 
pay gap 
0 0.006 
0.1 0.007 
0.2 0.009 
0.3 0.012 
0.4 0.017 
0.5 0.027 
0.6 0.056 
0.65 0.100 
0.7 0.267 
Notes: This Table uses the formula in (6), an estimated observed return to performance pay of 
0.124 (from Table 8), and an observed incidence of performance pay for men of 25% and 
women of 20%. 
 
Panel B: The Effect of Misclassifying ‘Non-competitive Contracts’ 
 
Misclassification 
rate for ‘competitive 
pay schemes, r0 
True Gender 
Difference in 
Incidence of 
‘Competitive 
Contracts’ 
Implied true return 
to performance pay 
for women 
Implied true return 
to performance pay 
for men 
0 0.13 0.20 0.25 
0.025 0.13 0.21 0.26 
0.05 0.14 0.23 0.27 
0.075 0.15 0.26 0.29 
0.1 0.17 0.30 0.31 
0.125 0.18 0.36 0.34 
0.15 0.20 0.50 0.39 
0.175 0.22 0.89 0.47 
 
Notes: This Table uses the formulae in (2) for the second column and (4) for the last two, an 
estimated observed return to performance pay of 0.124 (from Table 8), and an observed 
incidence of performance pay for men of 25% and women of 20%, and a misclassification 
rate of 0.6 for ‘competitive’ pay contracts. 
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Table 11: The Effects of Performance Pay on Earnings  
in Managerial and Professional Jobs 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Wages 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Sample All All Men Women 
Female -0.159 -0.146   
 [0.00907] [0.00890]   
Performance Pay  0.137 0.131 0.144 
  [0.0117] [0.0140] [0.0172] 
Other controls yes yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 11796 11796 6882 4914 
R-squared 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.31 
 
Notes. 
1. This is the same as Table 7 but with the sample restricted to managers and 
professionals. 
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Table A1 
Descriptive Statistics and Representative Earnings Functions and Performance Pay 
Equations 
 
 Descriptive 
Statistics - 
All 
Descriptive 
Statistics - 
Men 
Descriptive 
Statistics - 
Women 
Probit for 
Perfor-
mance 
Pay 
Earnings 
Function 
Log hourly wage 2.013 2.131 1.903   
 0.581 0.579 0.560   
Female 0.520 0.000 1.000 -0.012 -0.142 
 0.500 0.000 0.000 [0.006] [0.005] 
Performance pay 0.212 0.236 0.190  0.046 
 0.409 0.425 0.392  [0.007] 
CSE or equivalent 0.100 0.103 0.098 0.000 -0.064 
 0.301 0.304 0.297 [0.007] [0.007] 
A level 0.154 0.148 0.159 -0.004 0.058 
 0.361 0.355 0.366 [0.006] [0.006] 
Degree or equivalent 0.196 0.212 0.181 0.014 0.182 
 0.397 0.409 0.385 [0.007] [0.007] 
Postgraduate 0.068 0.075 0.061 0.048 0.251 
 0.251 0.263 0.240 [0.012] [0.010] 
No qualification 0.194 0.210 0.179 -0.009 -0.137 
 0.396 0.407 0.384 [0.007] [0.007] 
Other qualification 0.029 0.029 0.029 -0.022 -0.041 
 0.168 0.168 0.168 [0.011] [0.014] 
Age 25-29 0.193 0.181 0.204 0.034 0.236 
 0.395 0.385 0.403 [0.014] [0.015] 
Age 30-39 0.265 0.274 0.256 0.042 0.377 
 0.441 0.446 0.436 [0.015] [0.015] 
Age40-49 0.264 0.261 0.267 0.024 0.402 
 0.441 0.439 0.442 [0.015] [0.016] 
Age 50-59 0.201 0.198 0.203 0.020 0.404 
 0.400 0.399 0.402 [0.016] [0.016] 
Age 60+ 0.041 0.052 0.031 -0.007 0.329 
 0.199 0.222 0.175 [0.018] [0.019] 
White 0.933 0.936 0.931 -0.024 0.002 
 0.249 0.245 0.253 [0.011] [0.010] 
Kids 0.402 0.428 0.377 -0.007 0.023 
 0.490 0.495 0.485 [0.009] [0.009] 
Married 0.687 0.700 0.676 -0.009 0.042 
 0.464 0.458 0.468 [0.009] [0.008] 
Married*Kids 0.340 0.316 0.363 0.007 0.012 
 0.474 0.465 0.481 [0.010] [0.010] 
Tenure Less than 1 year 0.160 0.153 0.167 -0.006 -0.018 
 0.367 0.360 0.373 [0.007] [0.008] 
Tenure 2 to 3 years 0.247 0.233 0.260 0.002 0.043 
 0.431 0.423 0.439 [0.007] [0.007] 
Tenure 5 to 10 yrs 0.205 0.199 0.211 -0.012 0.069 
 0.404 0.400 0.408 [0.007] [0.007] 
Tenure 10+ years 0.262 0.295 0.230 -0.012 0.121 
 0.439 0.456 0.421 [0.008] [0.008] 
Log plant size 4.791 4.924 4.667 0.031 0.027 
 1.395 1.332 1.439 [0.003] [0.002] 
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manufacturing 0.145 0.220 0.076 -0.042 -0.124 
 0.352 0.414 0.265 [0.022] [0.014] 
construction 0.048 0.078 0.019 -0.033 -0.081 
 0.213 0.268 0.137 [0.026] [0.016] 
wholesale and retail 0.114 0.102 0.125 -0.001 -0.244 
 0.318 0.303 0.331 [0.027] [0.016] 
hotels and restaurants 0.034 0.028 0.040 -0.067 -0.375 
 0.182 0.166 0.195 [0.024] [0.019] 
transport and communication 0.063 0.097 0.031 -0.055 -0.097 
 0.242 0.296 0.174 [0.024] [0.018] 
financial services 0.059 0.049 0.069 0.160 -0.027 
 0.236 0.215 0.254 [0.041] [0.017] 
other business services 0.101 0.105 0.097 -0.002 -0.097 
 0.301 0.307 0.296 [0.026] [0.017] 
public administration 0.093 0.099 0.088 -0.030 -0.102 
 0.291 0.299 0.283 [0.029] [0.018] 
Education 0.123 0.068 0.173 -0.173 -0.286 
 0.328 0.253 0.378 [0.013] [0.016] 
Health 0.138 0.054 0.214 -0.163 -0.229 
 0.345 0.227 0.410 [0.014] [0.016] 
other community services 0.052 0.052 0.051 -0.055 -0.203 
 0.221 0.223 0.220 [0.024] [0.020] 
Year (1=2004) 0.442 0.427 0.454 0.135 0.302 
 0.497 0.495 0.498 [0.010] [0.006] 
Union recognition 0.483 0.479 0.487 0.062 0.008 
 0.500 0.500 0.500 [0.011] [0.007] 
Public Sector 0.334 0.264 0.399 -0.008 0.046 
 0.472 0.441 0.490 [0.017] [0.009] 
Managers 0.110 0.150 0.074 0.156 0.401 
 0.313 0.357 0.261 [0.025] [0.013] 
Professionals 0.148 0.161 0.136 0.045 0.364 
 0.355 0.367 0.343 [0.022] [0.013] 
Associate Professionals 0.131 0.131 0.131 -0.007 0.210 
 0.337 0.337 0.337 [0.020] [0.013] 
Clerical 0.199 0.082 0.306 0.047 0.023 
 0.399 0.275 0.461 [0.021] [0.012] 
Personal Services 0.080 0.051 0.107 -0.098 -0.067 
 0.271 0.220 0.309 [0.019] [0.017] 
Sales 0.072 0.043 0.099 0.049 -0.140 
 0.258 0.202 0.299 [0.028] [0.016] 
Operatives 0.081 0.133 0.033 -0.031 -0.155 
 0.273 0.340 0.178 [0.021] [0.015] 
Elementary  0.106 0.112 0.100 -0.050 -0.260 
 0.308 0.316 0.300 [0.019] [0.013] 
Job done only by men 0.123 0.253 0.002   
 0.328 0.435 0.049   
Job done mainly by men 0.189 0.344 0.046   
 0.392 0.475 0.209   
Job done by men+women 0.354 0.351 0.357   
 0.478 0.477 0.479   
Job done mainly by women 0.267 0.052 0.467   
 0.442 0.221 0.499   
Job done only by women 0.067 0.001 0.128   
 0.250 0.031 0.334   
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Observations    47367.000 45485.000 
R-squared     0.510 
 
Notes. 
1. the first 3 columns show means and standard deviations of the variables used for 
both genders together and for men and women. 
2. the fourth column shows the coefficients and standard errors of a probit regression 
where the dependent variable is having a performance pay contract – marginal 
effects are reported. 
3. the fifth column shows the coefficients and standard errors of an earnings function 
where the dependent variable is log hourly wages.  
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